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RECAP; Krakauer v. State of Montana: Montana’s Constitutional
Right to Know v. FERPA
Elijah Inabnit
I. VIVIAN HAMMILL FOR APPELLANT STATE OF MONTANA
Vivian Hammill began by claiming that the Montana University
System must protect the student privacy interests at stake in the
Commissioner’s records under both Montana Law and the Federal
Education Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA). Further, under either of these
laws, the fact that student information is made public by someone other
than the university does not change the responsibility of the university to
keep that same information protected. Pointing to the court order exception
of FERPA,1 Justice Baker asked Hammill whether or not a balancing test
would be appropriate to determine whether or not release was proper.
Hammill responded that a balancing test would not be appropriate.
Hammill asserted that the privacy interests of students should only be
overcome in the case of an exception to federal or state law. Hammill
claimed that to allow for disclosure in any other instance would cause
students to be hesitant of testifying in university disciplinary proceedings
for fear of public disclosure and thus create a chilling effect. Justice Shea
quickly asked whether redacting the names of students would solve this
problem. Hammill responded that redaction would not solve anything in
this case because Krakauer had asked for Jordan Johnson’s records by
name and the records contained information about students other than
Johnson.
Without being asked, Hammill launched into a discussion about
Krakauer’s lack of standing to request the Commissioner’s records under
the Montana Constitution. Hammill maintained that the Montana
Constitution only gave the right to know to Montana Citizens despite
heated questioning from the Court and the assertion that the test was really
wether or not Krakauer had a pulse, not whether he was a citizen.
II. MICHAEL MELOY FOR APPELLEE JON KRAKAUER
Just as soon as Michael Meloy had finished introducing himself,
Justice Wheat interrupted Meloy’s planned argument with a question and
the questions just kept on coming. Most troubling to the Court was the fact
that an in camera review of the Commissioner’s records had not been
performed by the District Court, meaning that the Court had nothing in the
record to review. Meloy did not offer a satisfying reason for the lack of the
review, claiming that he “didn’t like” in camera reviews because such a
1
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review leaves the requesting party in the dark as to the contents of the
records and unable to make arguments about the contents to a judge who
is privy to the contents. The Justices were quick to point out that they do
not care what Meloy likes but wanted to know why an in camera review
was not performed in this instance. Meloy stated that he understood in
camera reviews are part of the process and asserted that he never fought
against ordering such a review, leaving Hammill responsible for the lack
of one in this case.
Of significant importance was the actual information that
Krakauer wished to avail himself of by receiving the records. Meloy
asserted Krakauer simply wanted to see the process by which Johnson’s
previous disciplinary proceedings were reversed and did not care about the
behavior of the students involved. Meloy stated that Krakauer’s request
required the Court to weigh the constitutional right to know against the
right of privacy. Although lacking conviction, Meloy claimed that the
people of Montana need to know why the Commissioner reinstated
Johnson and that Krakauer represented the people by requesting that
information. Justice McKinnon asked whether or not students had any
heightened privacy to be considered when weighing the constitutional
rights. Meloy responded by pointing out that the Montana Constitution
does not differentiate between people in regard to the right of privacy and
that he does not believe students should have a heightened right of privacy.
When asked whether or not releasing the Commissioner’s records in this
case would lead to a pattern or practice that would be violative of FERPA,
Meloy responded that Montana’s weighing test was done on a case-bycase basis that could not establish a pattern or practice. Accordingly,
Meloy claimed that FERPA could be “harmonized” with Montana law.
In regard to whether or not Krakauer has standing to request the
Commissioner’s records, Meloy was dismissive of Hammill’s argument
that the Montana Constitution only grants the right to know to Montana
citizens. Meloy went so far as to say that he was “surprised” that Hammill
even raised the argument because simple constitutional interpretation
clearly leads to the conclusion that Krakauer has standing as a “person.”2
However, Meloy did not have a simple conclusion when it was pointed out
to him that the preamble uses “the people of Montana.”3
III. REBUTTAL OF VIVIAN HAMMILL FOR APPELLANT STATE OF
MONTANA
Hammill left herself a brief two minutes for rebuttal. During this
time, Hammill’s most salient point was that the Montana University

2
3
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System needs guidance from the Court as to how a student’s records
should be handled under the Montana Constitution and FERPA.
IV. ANALYSIS
The Court did not spend any time asking whether or not FERPA
preempted the Montana Constitution. Rather, the Court asked many
questions about the appropriate weight to be given to the right to know or
to the right of privacy. The emphasis on the balance hints that the Montana
Constitution will control the release because FERPA does not mandate a
balancing test but rather conditions release upon the satisfaction of specific
exceptions.4
While the Court pointed out that the preamble to the Montana
Constitution uses “the people of Montana,” this is not likely an indication
that the Court will find for the State on the issue of standing. According to
the preamble, “the people of Montana” established the constitution in
thanks for Montana’s beauty and “equality of opportunity” and in order to
“secure the blessings of liberty” for generations to come. 5 However, this
does not mean that the Montana Constitution only bestows protections
upon Montana citizens. When “the people of Montana” wrote the
constitution, they chose to provide the right to know to any “person” who
requests public documents.6
As to Hammill’s argument that releasing the records will result in
a chilling effect in regard to student testimony, redaction truly is the cure.
Krakauer did not include the name of the female student who alleged that
she was raped by Johnson in his book and the newspapers also guarded
her identity. The names of involved parties other than Johnson are either
unknown or scarcely known. Redacting the name of the alleged victim and
redacting any other students’ names in the released records truly would
preserve their privacy. Accordingly, when balancing the right of privacy
against the public’s right to know how the Commissioner dealt with the
star quarterback, the Court will likely find that the public’s right
outweighs.
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